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Evolution, Consistency, and Community: The
Political, Social, and Economic Assumptions that
Govern the Incorporation of Terms in British
Employment Contracts
Harry Hutchison'

I. Introduction
In Great Britain, as in the United States, entering an
employment relationship requires some form of agreement
generally referred to as the "contract of employment."'

British law

focuses on the existence of an individual contract of employment
that, regardless of union representation, governs the degree to
which a collective bargaining agreement will be incorporated into
the individual employment relationship. While both jurisdictions
provide employee protection against discrimination based on race,
sex, and disability, British workers are subject to broader and more
comprehensive national legislation.

This expanded protection

provides British workers with, among other things, both statutory3
I Professor of Law and Director, University of Detroit London Law Programme.
PGCE 1999, University of Bristol; J.D. 1986, Wayne State University; MBA 1977,
University of Michigan; M.A. 1975, Wayne State University. The author would like to
thank the following reviewers of earlier drafts: Elizabeth McKay, Diana Davis, Timothy
A. 0. Endicott, and Emma Garrow. The author also wishes to thank the staff at the
Bodleian Library, Oxford University for their assistance.
2 In Britain, a contract of employment is often called a "contract of service,"
which is distinguishable from a "contract for services." See, e.g., N. M. SELWYN,
SELWYN'S LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 46 (1996). A "contract for services" generally refers to
self-employed individuals or independent contractors who work personally for another
under a "contract of service." See id. While this distinction seems relatively easy to
state, in practice it has proved difficult to draw. Courts and employment Tribunals have
developed and employed a number of different tests and standards designed to enforce
this distinction. See generally id. at 46-68 (describing several such tests and standards);
see also SIMON DEAKIN & GILLIAN MORRIS, LABOUR LAW 149-68 (1998) [hereinafter
DEAKIN & MORRIS] (analyzing a number of different tests); M. R. FREEDLAND, THE
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (1976) (providing a historical overview of the issues
surrounding contracts of employment).
3 See Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, part X (Eng.), reprinted in 16
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 649 (4th ed. 1997) (regarding unfair
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and common law 4 protection against unfair dismissal and statutory
protection against layoffs5 and arbitrary discipline.6 The relatively
recent creation of such statutory and judge-made constraints on
employer freedom hints at new and perhaps communitarian
assumptions that may guide future employment decisions. These
developments validate the claim that "[r]elations between
employers and employed have indeed developed and are still
developing; and their development invites continuous
reconsideration by the courts of rules worked out in different
conditions., 7 Now, more than twenty years after Chappel v. Times
Newspapers, the content of employment contracts continues to
change in dramatic ways.8
Despite changes in the employment arena and reconsideration
by courts, most forms of employee protection must still be
preceded by a determination that a contract of employment
actually exists.9 Once a contract of employment has been
established, the next step is to determine the implication of the
pertinent terms and conditions of the contract.'" Consequently,
dismissal). Under British law as it existed before 1971, "an employer was entitled to
dismiss an employee for any reason or for no reason at all." SELWYN, supra note 2, at
324.
4 Usually, British workers receive limited protection against termination that is
equivalent to a dismissal at common law. See, e.g., DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at
396-97. Common law dismissals include (1) a dismissal with notice; (2) a dismissal for
fundamental breach (i.e., misconduct); and (3) wrongful dismissal. See generally id. at
396-438 (discussing wrongful dismissal). The actual contract terms may be important in
determining whether there has been a breach of the notice term, whether the termination
is grounded in a fundamental breach, or whether the dismissal is in fact wrongful. See id.
at 396-438; see also SELWYN, supra note 2, at 324-28.
5 See Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, part XI (Eng.), reprinted in 16
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 696 (4th ed. 1997) (regarding
redundancy payments).
6 See Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, part I (Eng.), reprinted in 16
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 576 (4th ed. 1997) (providing for
protection of wages against deductions); Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, part IV
(Eng.), reprinted in 16 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 596 (4th ed.
1997) (regarding protected shop workers and betting workers with respect to Sunday
work).
HALSBURY'S

7 Chappell v. Times Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 482, 503 ( Stephenson, L.J. 1975).
8 See Douglas Brodie, Commentary: Specific Performance and Employment
Contracts 27 INDUS. L. J. 37, 37 (1998).
9 See, e.g., SELWYN, supra note 2, at 69-74; FREEDLAND, supra note 2, at 8-11.
10 As Selwyn notes, "[i]t is usual to speak of the 'terms and conditions of
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employees who may have suffered a detriment at the hands of
their employer or employers seeking guidance on the extent of
their prerogative powers will focus on the underlying assumptions
that govern the incorporation of contract terms.
Standard economic analysis of the law emphasizes the
importance of voluntary exchange in maximizing the efficiency of
resource transfer from less to more valuable uses." According to
this view, value-maximizing transactions occur within the
contours of a process of exchange, which functions reliably under
agreed upon terms.'2 While this hypothesis is attractive in theory,
the reality of the employment relationship can be quite different
and more complex. Realistically, all of the circumstances that
may arise from the express terms of an employment contract
cannot be efficiently forecast under a transaction-cost analysis at
the time the employment relationship commences. 3 For example,
employees strictly complying with the express terms of a
collective agreement forbidding overtime may not anticipate a
court directive compelling them to desist from such compliance. 4
employment' which are part of every contract of employment, although no attempt ever
appears to have been made to define... this expression." SELWYN, supra note 2, at 74.
It has been argued by some that the terms of employment are bilateral; that is, they are
part of the agreement between the employer and the employee. See, e.g., id. On the other
hand, conditions of employment have been interpreted as unilateral instructions set forth
by the employer. See id. If this latter line of reasoning is correct, then changes in
employment terms can only occur after express or implied agreement to that effect,
whereas the employer can change a condition unilaterally at anytime. See id.
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101(1998).
12 See id.
13 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 237. Employment relationships can be

conceived as a form of bilateral monopoly. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 274. Bilateral
monopolies tend to increase transaction costs and the law may attempt to reduce such
costs-here, by not requiring that all the terms be specified before the relationship
commences. See id. In addition, one observer contends that because an employer
commands superior resources such as capital and information, while ordinary employees
lack the time and resources to choose between offers of employment and to haggle over
terms, government acceptance of employee subordination extends beyond merely
pecuniary forms. See Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the
Contract of Employment, 15 INDUS. L.J. 1 (1986). Usually, consent of the parties is
viewed as legitimizing any subordination created by the contractual obligation. See id.
Implicit in such consent is the notion that the employment contract empowers
management to direct the work of employees. See id.
" See, e.g., Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No. 2), 2 All E.R. 949
(Q.B. 1972) (holding employees in breach of contract where the court deemed the
union's strict compliance to a no-overtime provision violated the duty to serve employer
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Moreover, express reference to collective agreements or other
external sources often incorporates a number of terms that
generally are not bargained for individually. 5 The inclusion of
express terms, like the inclusion of implied terms, is subject to
various common law rules. 16
The process by which terms are incorporated can have decisive
and perhaps catastrophic consequences for one or both of the
parties to the agreement. While this article refers to the specifics
of this process, such references are not intended to be exhaustive.
Indeed, the primary objective of this article remains limited to: (1)
a modest investigation of the emerging academic and judicial
scholarship concerning the assumptions that govern the bases on
which terms are incorporated into the contract of employment in
Great Britain; 7 and (2) an investigation of whether those
assumptions recognize that equality of bargaining can no longer be
assumed to exist, and that deference to management prerogatives
can therefore no longer be perpetually justified.'"
Perhaps the most important evidence demonstrating the change
in the common law and the assumptions that undergird it lies in
the evolution of the obligation of mutual trust and confidence
brought on by a changing legal culture.'9 According to one
observer, the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence is
grounded on a "judicial vision of the workplace as a
faithfully). Regarding that decision, one observer states:
If the rulebook, by which they were working, was a part of their contracts of
employment, then, by adhering to it... they could hardly be said to be breaking
their contracts. However, one of the rules stated that employees should 'make
every effort to facilitate the working of trains and prevent unavoidable delay',
which would clearly prohibit any deliberate attempt to interpret the rules in such
a way as to achieve disruption of services.
supra note 2, at 91-92; see also, DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 237.
& MORRIS, supra note 2, at 237.
16 Courts often consider whether a specific term is procedural or substantive,
whether the disputed term is appropriate for inclusion, and whether the parties intended
that the term be incorporated. See generally, DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 258-77
(discussing interpretation of employment contracts).
SELWYN,

15 See DEAKIN

'7
I8

See infra notes 26-115 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.

'9 See Brodie, supra note 8, at 44; see also, PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL
COMMONWEALTH 362 (1992) (discussing the legal evolution of the obligation of mutual

trust and confidence).
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community. 2 ° If this view is correct, it constitutes a migration
from the principle of limited obligation in favor of more diffuse
and open-ended duties, in which the realities of association may
compel unequal contributions rather than carefully measured
reciprocity. 2 ' This evolution constitutes a true challenge to the
ideological basis of the contract at will.22
Part II develops an analytical basis of contract incorporation
by examining express, implied, and external incorporation as well
as the assumptions that underlie this process." Part III examines
one of Britain's most significant employment cases, which
signaled that the previously dominant assumptions governing the
incorporation of contract terms are now under review.24 This
article will also address the most important of those changes: the
emerging communitarian view that workers' interests range
beyond merely financial concerns and that deference to
management is no longer the status quo.25
II. The Basis of Incorporation
A. Incorporationof Express Terms, External Express Terms,
and Implied Terms
In Britain, the express terms agreed to by the parties to an
employment contract do not conclusively define the boundaries of
the final employment agreement,26 making it unclear precisely
where the express contract terms end and management prerogative
begins.27 Whether agreed to through individual negotiation or
incorporated by reference to an external source such as a collective
agreement, express terms produce legal obligations for which each

20

Brodie, supra note 8, at 44. See generally MICHAEL J.

SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND

(1998) (providing an introduction to communitarian theory);
104-107 (1999) (providing same).
21 See Selznick, supra note 19, at 362.

THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE

BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT

22 See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI.

L. REv. 947 (1984).
23 See infra notes 26-115 and accompanying text.
24

See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 122-38 and accompanying text.

26

See

27

See id. at 237.

DEAKIN & MORRIS,

supra note 2, at 236.
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party may be held accountable." Such contracts usually contain
an element of incompleteness, however, due to the impossibility of
anticipating all future events. 29 Granting the employer unilateral
rights can be seen as the common law's preferred solution to
contract incompleteness. 0 Such unilateral power, however, is
subject to reasonable limits. For instance, a city council could not
unilaterally alter the working hours of schoolteachers, although it
could require that teachers cover for absent colleagues.3 ' Provided
an employer's request remains reasonable and not contrary to the
express terms of the agreement made between the parties, courts
will allow such modifications.32 This perspective underscores the
more general conclusion that the "employee agrees to serve in
return for wages, rather than undertaking to provide a particular
service or product within which his or her labour is embodied."33
Concepts underlying British common law traditionally
recognize the idea that employers possess prerogative powers
beyond the scope of the express terms of the contract and that
34
employees must conform to an obligation of obedience.
Furthermore, that same body of law supports the employer's
implied power to lay down certain norms for the performance of
work, which do not necessarily take the form of contract terms.
Significantly, such implied conditions may include any bridging
terms that give effect to the normative contents of collective
agreements and become part of the express agreement between the
parties. 5
While these implied terms provide support for
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 236-37.
31 See id. at 238 (citing Sim v. Rotherham Metro Borough Council, 3 W.L.R. 851

(Ch. 1986)). While the teachers' contract was silent about whether they had an
obligation to provide cover, school teachers are members of a profession and a
professional contract would not normally be expected to detail the professional
obligations under the contract. See Sim, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 862. Their obligations
would instead be defined by the nature of their professions. See id.
32 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 238.
13

Id. at 237.

14See id. More precisely, workers agree to provide labor at the direction of the
employer for a period of time where the precise method of performance rests primarily
with the employer. See id.
35 Apart from seeking out a bridging term, courts routinely ask whether a particular
term is appropriate for incorporation. See id. at 263-65 (citing Anderson v. Pringle of
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managerial prerogative by expressing the employee's duties of
obedience, fidelity, and care, they also protect certain employee
expectations of continued employment.36 Furthermore, a longstanding reciprocal duty of cooperation binds both sides of the
employment contract.37

The obligations created by implied terms are diffuse and
epitomize the merging of contract and status. Despite some
changes since the nineteenth century, it is generally agreed that
implied conditions of the employment relationship are contractual
in nature.3"
Tests historically employed for implying or
incorporating contract terms include the officious bystander test39
and business efficacy test,40 both of which seek to discover the
unstated intentions of the parties. A third test, the legal incidents
test, focuses instead on the legal underpinning of the transaction.4
Consent justifies the incorporation of implied terms whether as a
result of the officious bystander, business efficacy, or legal
Scotland Ltd., [1998] IRLR 64 (a last-in, first-out provisions for redundancy selection
contained in the collective bargaining agreement was incorporated into the employee's
contract) and Alexander v. Standard Tel. & Cables Ltd. (No. 2), [1991] IRLR 296 (lastin, first-out clause deemed inappropriate for incorporation)); see, e.g., Wandsworth LBC
v. D'Silva, [1998] IRLR 193 (sick leave policy provided only "guidance" to employers
and not binding as incorporated term); Grant v. Southwest Trains Ltd., [1998] IRLR 188
(employer provision for equal opportunity not incorporated as overly general despite
widespread dissemination). In addition, the likelihood of incorporation and the
appropriateness for incorporation of express collective agreements into the individual
employment relationship may turn on whether the employer and the union have included
within their agreement a statement that the terms are intended to be binding in honor
only. See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 265-66. Such a provision, along with the
current presumption in British law, will likely preclude the collective agreement, or a
provision within it, from taking effect with respect to the individual employment
relationship. See id.
36 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 238.
37See id.
38 See id. at 240.
31 See id; see, e.g., Shirlaw v. Southern Foundaries Ltd., 2 K.B. 206 (1939)

(officious bystander test turns on whether issue is "so obvious as to go without saying");
British Broadcasting Company v. Kelley-Phillips, [1997] IRLR 571 (applying officious
bystander test to determine existence of fixed-term contract).
40 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 240; see, e.g., Bauman v. Hulton Press
Ltd., 2 All E.R. 1121 (Q.B. 1952) (giving business efficacy to commissions contract
required that employer provide employee with reasonable amount of work during term of
contract).
41 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 241.
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incidents test. 42 Moreover, express terms may be qualified by an
implied obligation to exercise the powers they create reasonably.
For instance, in the case Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health
Authority43 at least one judge concluded that an express contractual
provision requiring junior doctors to work as many as eighty-eight
hours a week must be exercised reasonably in view of the possible
consequences to the employee's health." Furthermore, implied
terms, when incorporated, will not always favor management.45
Sources of express terms that are external to the individual
employment relationship "derive not from the parties' own
agreement but, for example, from agreements involving third
parties," and include statutes, collective bargaining, and custom
and practice. 6 Statutory protections sometimes amend the terms
and/or conditions of the contract of employment.47 For example,
the Equal Pay Act of 1970 incorporates into employment contracts
a clause requiring equal treatment for men and women, regardless
of whether it is expressly provided for in the contract. 8 Similarly,
the National Minimum Wage Act of 1998 incorporates into all
employment contracts a clause requiring that employers pay their
49
employees
according
to the national
minimum
Terms may
be incorporated
by reference
to trade
usage wage.
or the custom
and

42

See id. at 240-41.

2 All E.R. 293 (1991).
44 See Johnstone, [1992] QB 333 at 350 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.).
45 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 332 (citing Malik v. BCCI, 3 W.L.R. 95
(H.L. 1997)). The rule in Addis V. Gramophone Co., [1909] AC 488, decided that an
employee could not recover damages for injured feelings. By contrast Malik takes a
view premised on an implied mutual obligation of trust and confidence. See DEAKIN &
MORRIS, supra note 2, at 333-34. Accordingly, damages to an employee's reputation are
recoverable. See id. at 334; see also Douglas Brodie, A FairDeal at Work, 19 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 83 (1999) [hereinafter, Brodie A Fair Deal at Work]. For an
argument that would preclude the parties from contracting out of their mutual obligation
see Douglas Brodie, Beyond Exchange: The New Contract of Employment, 27 INDUS.
L.J. 79 (1998) [hereinafter Brodie, Beyond Exchange[.
46 DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 235.
43

47 See id. at 244. Traditionally courts seem to regard most types of protective
legislation as imposing extra-contractual obligations on employers. See id. at 245.
48 The Equal Pay Act 1970, ch. 41, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 16 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES

35 (4th ed. 1997).

The National Minimum Wage Act 1998, ch. 39, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 16
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 54 (Current Statutes Service).
49
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practice of the plant or workplace, especially where the parties
implicitly contract on the assumption that informal norms would
apply. ° Work-rules may or may not have contractual effect."
They may be incorporated through a bridging term in the
individual contract or by way of analogy to custom and practice.532
Similar rules apply to the incorporation of collective agreements.
B. Assumptions
The varied and, at times, elusive assumptions that seem to
dominate decisions concerning the incorporation of terms can be
examined by surveying: (1) contract incompleteness and the grant
of unilateral rights of direction to the employer; (2) the interplay
of managerial prerogatives and the courts' determination of
implied terms in deference to management; (3) the interpretation
of statutory provisions-especially concerning unfair dismissalgranting deference to management; (4) the status of the rulebook
and work-rules incorporated through bridging terms or by analogy
to custom derived at least, in part, from the ideology of masterservant; and (5) the collective bargaining agreement and the joint
selection of the rulebook grounded in notions of voluntarism,
equality of bargaining, and autonomy from government influence.
One enduring assumption is the notion that individual workers
possess the same economic, social, and political power as that
possessed by employers. 4 The reality can be quite different.
Rigid adherence to traditional contract approaches and the
"archetypal models of master and servant" sustain notions of
subordination. 5 An inherent tension exists between the social
demands of the employment relationship and the spirit of the
common law, which is inspired by a belief in the equality-real or
fictitious-of individuals.56 The unilateral power that employment
50 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 266-67.
51 See id. at 268; see also infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
52 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 268-69; see also infra notes 107-08 and

accompanying text.
53 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 268-69.
54 See LORD KENNETH WILLIAM WEDDERBURN,
FURTHER ESSAYS IN LABOUR LAW 111 (1995).

LABOUR LAW AND FREEDOM:

55 See id.
56 See PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC

POLICY 13 (1995); see also Collins, supra note 13, at 1. Collins observes, "[c]ontracts
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contracts grant employers to direct employees' work remains an
important assumption that underlies the incorporation of terms
within the employment contract. In practice, this requires the
employee to give her first allegiance to the employer, perhaps at
the cost of her own job security.57 This grant of direction to
employers is not, however, open-ended. For example, if an
employer permits sexual harassment, it breaches the requirement
of mutual cooperation.58 Nonetheless, judicial deference to a
managerial prerogative power that lies beyond the express terms
of the contract belies the view that traditional contract dogma has
supplanted master-servant ideology in the interpretation of
employment contracts.59
It might be argued that the evolution of judicial laissez-faire in
employment bargaining premised on the assumption of selfregulation by the parties, served to ameliorate the imbalance in
bargaining power. Conversely, it has been argued that a clear
understanding of employee subordination requires acceptance of
the notion of its dual source, which cannot be legitimated by
consent.60 The dual source of worker subordination is derived
from both market and bureaucratic power.6' Accordingly, even
where the employee enjoys improved bargaining power because of
either improved collective bargaining or because she possesses a
special 62skill, the social dimension of subordination remains
vibrant.
C. DoctrinalConsistency or Inconsistency?
The failure to understand the dual source nature of worker
subordination affects the incorporation of employment terms,
especially when legislative power seeks to counteract economic
power as opposed to social power. This oversight also allows
engender relations of power. Normally, however, the consent of the parties legitimates
any subordination created by the contractual obligations. The contract of employment
confers power upon management to direct the work of employees." Id.

17See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 238 (citing Cresswell v. Board of Inland
Revenue, 2 All E.R. 713 (Ch. 1984)).
58 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 238.
19 See id. at 238-41.
60 SeeCollins, supranote 13, at 1.
61

62

See id.
See id.
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courts to confuse the employment relationship with a contract
relationship and accordingly employ contract-like terminology in
adjudicating this relationship. For example, the:
[o]rdinary nexus between manager and employee cannot be
described as a contractual relation, for they have never actually
made a contract together. Instead, they have both agreed with a
third party, usually a company ... to join the same organisation
at different points of entry in the hierarchy of ranks."
This failure to recognize the dual source of subordination leads
in Collins' view to doctrinal inconsistency. This article examines
this perceptive contention in the context of (1) the status of the
rulebook or employee handbook; (2) contract modification; (3)
incorporation of collective agreements; (4) interpretation of
statutes (unfair dismissal law); and (5) custom and practice. By
doing so, this article exposes underlying assumptions, which lead
to doctrinal inconsistencies.
1. The Status of the Rulebook
Doctrinal inconsistency exists in British law with respect to the
status of the rulebook, or employee handbook in the terminology
of American employment law. 64 Trapped "between the conflicting
considerations of interpreting the rulebook as it was intended-an
exercise of the discretionary power of management for the timebeing-and as a means of protecting an employee's expectations,
the courts vacillate in their judgements on its contractual status. ' ,'
Accordingly, in Secretary of State for Employment v. A.S.L.E.F.
(No.2), the employer's rulebook was viewed not as setting forth
contractual terms, but as a set of instructions issued under the
general prerogative of management. 66 Thus, the court's decision
63

Id. at 3.

64

Compare the development of British law regarding interpretation of the rulebook

(also known as "works rules") to American law regarding employee handbooks. See,
e.g., Cummings v. South Portland Housing Authority, 985 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993)
(handbooks containing standards of behavior create just cause standard for termination);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, 99 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) (employees need not
expressly rely on the terms of the handbook for terms to be binding); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (employers bound by
handbook terms based on benefit of orderly workplace provided by manual).
65 Collins, supra note 13, at 4.
66 See Secretary of State for Employment v. A.S.L.E.F. (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 1362

(Q.B. 1972).
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that a "work-to-rule" practice was in fact a breach of contract
followed closely on this vision of the rulebook.67 This approach
endorses the perception that "rule-books constitute a temporary
exercise of managerial prerogative, which can always be amended
or supplemented by further instructions."68 The court in R. v. East
Berkshire Area Health Authority, ex parte Walsh,69 however,
reached a different conclusion. There, the court treated certain
regulations contained in the rulebook as terms of the contract of
employment, thereby avoiding judicial review and limiting the
applicant to a cause of action in private law. 70 Hence, a sharp
conflict exists between the view that the rulebook comprises a
discretionary exercise of managerial power on the one hand, and
on the other hand, regarding it as a contractual document, which
Both decisions highlight the
affords individual rights.7'
prominence of deference to traditional managerial prerogatives
and limitations on judicial intervention on behalf of subordinate
workers.
2. ContractModification
Cataloging what political, social, and economic assumptions
govern the incorporation of terms through the above analysis
illuminates contract modification after formation. While a strict
contractual approach would require a fresh agreement, in practice,
the employer simply issues fresh directions or employees
unilaterally commence new tasks or abandon old ones.73 The
courts, perhaps incoherently, circumvent the requirement of
express agreement for modification by interpreting the contract of
employment by reference to subsequent conduct. 4 By doing so,
67

See Collins, supra note 13, at 4.

68 Id. at 5.
69

3 W.L.R. 818 (C.A. 1985).

70

See East Berkshire Area Health Authority, [ 1985] 3 W.L.R. at 827.

71 See Collins, supra note 13, at 5.

See, e.g., Cresswell v. Board of Inland Revenue, 2 All E.R. 713 (Ch. 1984)
(implied obligation for employees to adapt to new methods sustained as an operative
incorporated contract term).
73 See Collins, supra note 13, at 8.
74 See 0. Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN 58-9 (A. Flanders & H. Clegg, eds., 1954); see also Collins, supra
note 13, at 8; see, e.g., Howman & Son v. Blyth, [1983] I.C.R. 416 (national working
72
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the courts implicitly accept worker subordination while
entertaining the fiction that parties with equal bargaining power
formed the contract.
3. Incorporationof Terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement
One question that has arisen with great frequency, and to
which differing answers have been given, lies in whether an
individual's contract of employment incorporates terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Much ink has been spilt over the
notion of the appropriateness of terms for incorporation, with
substantive terms viewed as more easily incorporated than
procedural ones.75
In Anderson v. Pringle of Scotland, Ltd.,76 the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement were incorporated despite the
employer's contention that it was inapplicable. In 1986, Pringle of
Scotland entered into a collective agreement with the GMB trade
union, part of which concerned redundancy procedures, including
termination procedures based on length of service-"first in, last
out"." However, the agreement expressly provided that this term
was not to be legally enforceable.78 When Pringle of Scotland
chose to terminate 290 employees based on a selectivity scheme
not agreed to by either Anderson or the GMB trade union,
Anderson contested his termination. 79 The court held that despite
the express contrary provision, the "first in, last out" term of the
collective agreement bound the employer.8 ° The holding in
Anderson bars the claim of management prerogative in selecting
employees for redundancy and protects the position of employees
generally.
rule prima facie evidence of incorporation of terms); Joel v. Cammell Laird (Shiprepairers), Ltd., 4 I.T.R. 206 (1969) (collective bargaining agreement incorporated
where both parties conscious of trade union afffairs). But see Dudfield v. Ministry of
Works, 108 Sol. J. 118 (1964) (pay increase provision subject to ministry approval not
automatically included).
75 See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 263-65.
76 1998 IRLR 64 (Court of Session, November 19, 1997) (LEXIS, Enggen Library,
Cases File).
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80

See id.
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In Alexander v. Standard Telephone & Cables (No. 2),8"
however, the court declined to incorporate the terms of a collective
agreement under similar circumstances.
There, Standard
Telephone employed workers under the terms of collective
agreements negotiated with various unions, which provided that
selection for redundancy would be on the basis of service, with
supplementary provisions relating to the maintenance of a balance
of skills among the workforce. 2 Workers filed for an injunction
when they were terminated based on redundancy, rather than
under a length of service policy.83 The court held that the length of
service term, the "first in, last out" provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, had not been expressly
included and
84
employer.
the
on
binding
not
was
therefore
While these two decisions might be difficult to reconcile,
Anderson v. Pringleof Scotland, Ltd. suggests greater concern for
employee vulnerability in a way that highlights the growing
concern of courts and commentators for protecting the
expectations of employees.85
In fact, since the collective
agreement acts principally to alter the terms of the code (rulebook)
governing the workplace, one observer states that an employment
relationship derived at least in part from a collective agreement,
should only be modified by proof that the employer has exercised
its power reasonably." If the rulebook is simply an exercise of
private bureaucratic power, then there is no need to incorporate the
terms of the collective agreement into the contract of employment.
In reality, however, collective bargaining exists as a form of joint
selection of the rulebook which emerged within the context of
limited legal and expansive social rules in which employers and
employees formulated their own codes of conduct and their own
machinery for enforcement.87 Hugh Collins further posits that
employees should receive protection against changes not by virtue
81 1991 IRLR 286 (Queen's Bench, May 24, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases

File).
82 See id.
83

See id.

84 See id.
85

See, e.g., Peace v. Edinburgh City Council, [1999] SLT 712.

86 See 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 154-66 (1983).
87

at 75.

See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 56, at 9; DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2,
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of absolute contractual rights, but on the principle of estoppel
derived from public law.88
Although Collins' position may improve theoretical
consistency, the courts have not followed his reasoning. Rather,
"[t]hey insist upon the protection of the employee's interests
through the ordinary law of contract, though at the cost of
considerable distortion of ordinary legal principles."89 The normal
pattern of judicial reasoning holds "the collective agreement was
incorporated into the contract of employment by express reference
or by custom, but that in the event of the termination of the
collective agreement or its major modification, no alteration of the
individual's contract of employment takes place without his
express or implied consent." 90
This view assumes equality between both employer and
employee. Yet, management generally has greater access to
information, possesses superior capital, and maintains excellent
access to legal advice. These factors, when taken together, reduce
the opportunity costs of not hiring someone and facilitate control
over the terms of the contract. 9' Therefore, based on these superior
assets, the assumed voluntarism associated with collective
bargaining likely favors management. 92
4. The Interpretationof Statutes - Unfair DismissalLaw
In both discussions of the impact of collective agreements and
general contract modification, the concept of the employment
relationship as a contract derives from the notion of agreement that
provides legitimacy rather than of actual fairness."93 On the other
hand, the law of unfair dismissal aspires to bring actual fairness
into the exercise of private bureaucratic power.94 In practice,
88 See Collins, supra note 13, at 6-8.
89 Id. at 7.
90 Robertson v. British Gas Corporation [1983] I.C.R. 351 (C.A) (Court of Appeal,

December 17, 1982) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
91 See generally Collins, supra note 13, at 11; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); see, e.g., Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 3 All E.R. 757 (Q.B.
1974) (courts will analyze bargaining disparities under doctrine of undue influence).
92 See Collins, supra note 13, at 1.

93 See id. at 10.
9' See DAVIES &

FREEDLAND,

supra note 56, at 459.
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however, the courts' reliance on the concept of the contract and
the embedded and related master-servant assumption impedes
development of this distinction.95
The pattern of granting
compensation rather than reinstatement as the remedy for unfair
dismissal illustrates a "preference for regarding employment as a
purely economic transaction.""
In contrast, viewing the
relationship as involving social power, status, and dignity would
justify re-instatement of the employee and thereby invalidating the
abuse of private bureaucratic power.97 Furthermore, the courts'
overt concern with procedural as opposed to substantive fairness
when applying fairness tests in the context of employee discipline
reveals the assumption that every term of employment protects an
economic interest.99
Additionally, the "range of reasonable
responses" test, which is normally employed in assessing
employer action, evaluates the standard of reasonableness by
customary practices in employment, not by reference to notions of
fairness.99 This test may reinforce prior assumptions embedded in
the status quo and derived from the common law, which sustain
the assertion that British unfair dismissal law, far from controlling
managerial discretion and protecting the interests of employees in
job security, legitimates managerial authority to regulate the labor
market."0
Recently courts have declined to accord normative effect to

95See, e.g., Devis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins, [1976] ICR 196 (Q.B.) (origin of
distinction between unfair dismissal as opposed to wrongful dismissal).
96 Collins, supra note 13, at 11.
See generally, HUGH COLLINS, JUSTICE IN
(1992). But see Gwyneth Pitt, Justice in Dismissal:A Reply to Hugh Collins,
22 INDUS. L.J. 251 (1993) (analyzing flaws in Collins' fundamental principles and
discouraging reinstatement as a remedy for unfair dismissal).
DISMISSAL

97See Collins, supranote 13, at 11.
98 See HOWARD F. GOSPEL & GILL PALMER, BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 92116 (1993). But see COLLINS, supra note 96, at 70-71 (dismissing claim that workers
possess ownership rights in their jobs while recognizing job security vis-A-vis
compensation).
99 See Collins, supra note 13, at 11; see, e.g., Haddon v. Van Den Bergh Foods
Ltd., [1999] I.L.R. 1150 (analyzing reasonableness test under the Employment Rights
Act of 1996 § 98(4)); British Leyland U.K. Ltd. v. Swift [1981] IRLR 91 (C.A.)
(analyzing employer's dismissal under reasonable employer test).
"I See Hugh Collins, Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law INDUS. L. J. 170, 177 (1982).
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statutory particulars of terms.'0 ' In Jones v. Associated Tunnelling,
Ltd., '02 the employment tribunal admitted evidence based on
practice to indicate that the employee's mobility obligation was
not as extensive as his written statement suggested. 03
Furthermore, many British labor provisions cannot be set aside to
the detriment of the weaker party.' ° Moreover, new laws and
recent judicial interpretations constrain the freedom of the parties
to decide whether to enter into an employment relationship as well
the terms that are available to them and hence available for
incorporation.' °5 Despite the veracity of this assertion, the masterservant model of employment "run[s] deep into the culture of
judicial assumptions, including the interpretation of employment
protection legislation ' ' ' .
5. Custom and Practice
Custom and practice considerations are not limited to the
examination of statutory particulars and may favor either
employees or management. 0 7 Courts' disinclination to allow
expansive application of this approach reflects the judiciary's
acceptance of the formalization of contract terms and conditions
derived from employment protection legislation. 8 This practice

101 See DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 56, at 279; see, e.g., Carmichael v.
National Power [1999] 4 All E.R. 897 (employees not qualifying under Employment
Protection Act of 1978 not entitled to written particulars); Eagland v. British
Telecommunications, [1993] I.C.R. 644 (Employment Appeals Tribunal not obliged to
invent terms of employment not required under Employment Protection Act of 1978);
Mears v. Safecar Securities Ltd., 2 All E.R. 865 (1982) (where statutory particulars
silent, industrial tribunal given jurisdiction to determine terms).
102 1981 I.R.L.R. 477 (Employment Appeal Tribunal, October 16, 1981) (LEXIS,
Enggen Library, Cases File).
103 See id.
104 See Kahn-Freund, "A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law" at

635-6, 640-1, reprintedin
105 See id.

DAVIES

& FREEDLAND, supra note 56, at 106.

106 WEDDERBURN, supra note 54, at 111.
See, e.g., North Riding Garage v.
Butterwick [1967] 2 QB 56 (implied term of employee adaptation to changing methods
incorporated to thwart employees' right to redundancy payments).
107 See Malik v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International, SA [BCCI], 3 W.L.R.

95 (HL 1997).
108See Deakin & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 268. See, e.g., Bond & Neads v. CAV
Ltd., [1983] I.R.L.R. 360 (holding customary right to terminate without pay surpassed by
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arguably reveals the courts' acceptance of evolutionary change in
not only the employment relationship, but in the assumptions
which underlie it as well. Nonetheless, management, through
greater access to information on custom and practice, maintains an
advantage. Where custom and practice are influential arguments,
this assumption may disadvantage individual workers.
6. DistinguishingPublicfrom PrivateLaw
The incorporation of terms into the contract decision must
frequently take into consideration the assumed distinction between
private and public law that British courts frequently address.'0 9
Courts seem reluctant to intervene with respect to the use of
private managerial power and thus fail to comprehend that the
effects of private power mirror those of governmental power.
Perforce, British courts accept the political assumption that private
power should not be subjected to the same limits as public power.
This perception is reinforced by comprehending that when the
court views the arrangement of employment as purely contractual,
legitimate employee expectations may be given short shrift and the
only remedy available may be compensation." 0 When courts
conceive the employment relationship as one that includes both
market and bureaucratic subordination necessarily subject to
regulation, they may be more inclined to incorporate the concept
of natural justice. This conception allows the employee to seek
and to receive equitable remedies irrespective of whether the
employer possesses public or private power."' If this view is
persuasive, it may help drive British labor law toward doctrinal
consistency.
collective agreements on guaranteed pay).
109 See Collins, supra note 13, at 14. Unlike American employment law, Britain
makes no formal distinction between public and private employees aside from
restrictions on outside political activities. See DEAKIN AND MORRIS, supra note 2, at 70.
110 See, e.g., R. v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority, ex parte Walsh, 3 W.L.R.
818 (C.A. 1985) (rights arising directly from contractual duties remain private law issues
subject to compensation, while employment obligations imposed by statute are
essentially public with other possible remedies).
"I Natural justice as discussed here is a concept derived largely from the public law
of Britain, which under limited circumstances is applicable to private employment as
well. See generally DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 70-73; Collins, supra note 13, at
5-6. In essence, natural justice requires judicial review of the fairness of the employer's
conduct. See DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 70-73.
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D. Analysis
If the foregoing examination of the dominant political, social,
and economic assumptions is correct, an emerging consensuslike the consensus among critics of the American common law of
employment' -implies that individuals within the employment
relationship, contract or not, are subject to the "exercise of
arbitrary power by persons with dominant economic [and social, if
not political] position."'' 3 The immobility of workers may
exacerbate the exercise of arbitrary power by reducing choice and
increasing transaction costs.
Such market imperfections
characterize the employment environment in Great Britain. 14 In
response, commentators, legislators, and courts have attempted,
and continue to attempt to redress this perceived imbalance in
economic, social, and political power. Such a reconsideration
erodes the historic deference to (1) management power; (2)
contract terminology and assertions of "freedom of contract"; (3)
the presumption of "equal" bargaining power in parties'
negotiation; and (4) the belief that workers are only animated by
their financial interest.
The following section highlights Malik v. Bank of Credit and
Commerce International [BCCI],"5' the British case that heralded
the demise of previously dominant incorporation assumptions.
This case, when paired with other evidence, suggests an
evolutionary acceptance in British employment law of a new
communitarian perspective on the employment relationship.
III. Malik v. Bcci and Evolutionary Change
A. Malik v. BCCI
In Malik, two long-serving employees of a bank that collapsed
as a result of a massive fraud claimed that they lost more than their
jobs."16 They asserted that they lost their reputation, and as a result
112 For a short introduction to the critics of the formerly ascendant common law, see
Epstein, supra note 22, at 947-51.
113 See id. at 949.
114See, e.g., Irwin Stelzer, Free Markets Will Deliver the Goods If Left Alone, THE
TIMES (LONDON), December 20, 1998.
1153 W.L.R. 95 (H.L. 1997).
116 See Malik [1997] 3W.L.R. at 97.
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were put at a disadvantage when seeking new employment."'
Their claim contended that an implied term within the contract of
employment required their employer to conduct its business in a
manner that was not likely to destroy or seriously damage the
relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and the
employee.' 8 The House of Lords validated this novel claim
holding that certain employer practices may frustrate the service of
an employee and restrict his ability to obtain future employment." 9
This decision, like other recent judgements, suggests that
British judges are beginning to view the employment relationship
from a communitarian perspective, which exposes as inadequate
classical theories of contract law.'20 The decision in Malik
confirms the nascent view that "the parties to the employment
contract should look out for the interests' ' of
the other in a way that
2
one would not expect in most contracts. 1 1
The implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence which,
while still new, has been incorporated into employment contracts.

"1

See id. at 98.

1l8 Seeid.

t19See Malik, 3 All E.R. I (H.L. 1997). The court stated:
An employer was under an implied obligation that he would not, without
reasonable and proper cause, conduct his business in a manner likely to destroy
or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer
and employee, and an employer who breached the trust and confidence term
would be liable if he thereby caused continuing financial loss of a nature that
was reasonably foreseeable. Thus, if it was reasonably foreseeable that conduct
in breach of the trust and confidence term would prejudicially affect employees'
future employment prospects and loss of that type was sustained in consequence
of a breach, then in principle damages in respect of the loss would be
recoverable. The trust-destroying conduct need not be directed at the employee,
either individually or as part of a group, in order to attract liability, nor was it
necessary that the employee must have been aware of the employer's trustdestroying conduct while he was an employee.
Id. at 95.
120 See Brodie, supra note 8, at 45; see, e.g., University of Nottingham v. Eyett, 2
All E.R. 437 (Ch.D. 1999) (implied duty of trust and confidence may require employers
in some cases to counsel employees on beneficial use of pension funds); Walker v.
Northumberland City Council, I All E.R. 737 (Q.B. 1995) (employer must take
affirmative steps to protect employees from psychological harm); Scally v. Southern
Health Board, 4 All E.R. 563 (H.L. 1991) (employer responsible for informing employee
of inconspicuous terms contained in employment contract).
121 Brodie, supra note 8, at 45.
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That obligation is grounded in yet another duty-the duty of
cooperation. The long-standing duty of cooperation plays a
limited role in contract law as well as employment law, by
protecting the rights of the parties to perform their obligations and
prohibiting behavior which would render performance difficult or
impossible.' On the other hand, some commentators have argued
that the implied mutual obligation of trust and confidence derives
its significance as the positive variant of the general obligation of
cooperation.'23

In other words, "[t]here are . . . a significant

number of cases where the employer's right to exercise clear,
express powers under the contract have been held subject to either
the implied obligation of trust and confidence or to notions of
reasonableness."' 2 4 As such cases grow in number, they constitute
an important alteration of the general rules of contract law on the
relationship of express and implied terms.'25 Most striking for our
purposes, these cases erode the historic assumptions of (1)
deference to the master-servant ideology; (2) deference to the
sovereignty of contracts between parties with equal bargaining
power; and (3) the judicial presumption that only
economic/financial inequality and subordination characterize
unequal bargaining situations.
In Scally v. Southern Health Board,2 6 for example, the court
required the employer to provide information about the right of
employees to purchase additional years of pensionable service.
The court held that under certain situations, employers may labor
under an implied duty to safeguard the interests of its employees.'27
This interpretation erodes the traditional assumption in contract
122

See Brodie, Beyond Exchange, supra note 45, at 80.

The British duty of

cooperation compares to the American concept of good faith and fair dealing; see, e.g.,
Fortune v. NCR, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (performance of employment contracts
terminable at will contain requirement of good faith and fair dealing); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 205 (1981) ("[E]very contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
123 See Brodie, Beyond Exchange, supra note 45, at 81.
Id.; see, e.g., McLory v. The Post Office, I All E.R. 457 (1993) (employer bound
to act reasonably in effecting termination); United Bank v. Akhtar, [1989] I.R.L.R. 507
(employers must exercise reasonable discretion in requiring employee to transfer under
the employment contract).
125 See Brodie, Beyond Exchange, supra note 45, at 81.
124

126

3 W.L.R. 778 (H.L. 1991).

127

See Scally, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 787-89.
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that both parties, and especially employees, are always capable of
looking out for themselves. In addition, Scally implies that
consent to particular terms is no longer sufficient to legitimate the
subordination of the individual to the interests of the firm.
Furthermore, this decision recognizes the fiction that consent
derives from agreement between parties who possess the same
economic, social, or political power. Accordingly, this decision,
like Malik, confirms an evolution in the assumptions and law
governing employment relations in the United Kingdom and
seems to move Britain in a communitarian direction.
Additional illustrations of this pattern of change may be found
within the statutory arena. Britain introduced its first
comprehensive Minimum Wage Act'28 and its first Working Time
Directive' 29 in 1998.
These statutory measures limited
compensatory damages available in unfair dismissal actions as
well as discrimination suits'3 ° and expanded the compensation
available for unfair discharge actions. "' As the verdicts in Malik,
Scally, Johnstone, and other recent cases imply, judges, courts,
and employment tribunals are re-evaluating their historic
deference to management prerogatives by both insisting that such
prerogatives be exercised reasonably and by asserting that implied
obligations can protect individual employees as well as employers.
Taken together, these developments suggest that those
academic commentators who have historically challenged
128 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, c.39 (Eng.) reprinted in 16 HALSBURY'S

54 (Current Statutes Service).
Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, part X (Eng.), reprinted in 16
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 557 (4th ed. 1997) as amended by
Working Time Regulations, 1998, SI 1998 No. 1833, reg. 31 (Eng.).
131 See The National Minimum Wage Act 1998, ch. 39, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 16
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 54 (Current Statutes Service); Working
Time Regulations, 1998, SI 1998 No. 1833, reg. 31 (Eng.); Sex Discrimination and
Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations 1993, SI 1993 No. 2798 (Eng.). Until 1993, the
legislation for sex discrimination applied an upper limit on the amount of compensation
available-the upper limit on both sex discrimination and race discrimination was latter
abolished. See also DEAKIN & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 621-22.
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES
129

"I' Amendments to the Employment Rights Act 1996 contained in the Employment
Relations Bill 1999 state that the sum specified in section 124(1) of the Employment
Relations Act 1996, as the limit for compensation for unfair dismissal, shall be raised to
£50,000 effective in 1999. See Employment Relations Act 1999, c.26, § 34(4) (Eng.)
(July 27, 1999) (LEXIS, Country & Region Library, UK Legislation and Regulations
File).
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deference to management and argued for the equal regulation of
both governmental and private power have been heard. As such,
the previously unchallenged logic of the common law, with its
embedded assumptions and bias against workers, no longer enjoys
a hegemonic position.
IV. Conclusion
Any attempt to discover the political, social, and economic
assumptions governing incorporation is fraught with risk. First,
consent is, or at the very least has been, assumed to legitimate
subordination."3 Second, the level of worker subordination has
consistently and historically been assumed-when it is considered
at all-to consist primarily of economic subordination.'33 Thus,
courts, hampered perhaps by the political power of hierarchies,
discount the employer's social power and accordingly, undercut
the protective value of legislation.3 4 Furthermore, courts may
overemphasize the value of custom and practice by deferring to
management, which vindicates the master-servant ideology. "5
Third, labor and social legislation, increasingly seen as an external
constraint on the freedom of contract, even where it does not take
the form of a contract term, may restrict contractual autonomy and
restore contractual reciprocity by placing limits on managerial
prerogatives.'
This development, along with the creation of
judge-made communitarian duties, implies that complete
deference to managerial prerogatives is no longer warranted. Last,
the history of the evolutionary changes in the employment
relationship has raised the profile of the tension between the ideal
of freedom and the domination of workers'37 as well as some of the
modest efforts to deal with it. Such an approach will likely
enhance the vitality of efforts which emphasize the public,
regulatory character of labor law whilst resisting a rigid focus on
the rights of the parties. Whether such an approach truly benefits

132 See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
133

See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.

134 See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.

"I See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 46-53, 104-05 and accompanying text; see also
MORRIS, supra note 2, at 235-236.

137 See Collins, supra note 100, at 78.
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British workers is beyond the scope of this enterprise. Whatever
its benefits, Britain's current emphasis on communitarian
approaches to contract law may or may not be transferable to the
United States. Given America's insistence on rights' 38 and its
historic and continued commitment to individualism, it is far from
clear that the United States is ready or should be ready to embrace
such a communitarian perspective.

38 One distinguished observer rather elegantly asserts that freedom of contract
tends to advance individual autonomy and promote the efficient operation of the labor
market. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 951. Furthermore, he argues that freedom of
contract is an end in itself. See id. at 953.

